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I. INTRODUCTION
Unlike my fellow panelists who are lawyers, I am a historian and have
been professionally trained-in the past tense-to answer questions such
as, "Do (or should) juveniles have more, less, the same, or different rights
than adults?" In my remarks today, I will explain how conceptions of
children's rights have been used to shape the American juvenile justice
system's development. First, I will argue that we should take a long view
of this history.' Next, I will focus on three specific eras of twentieth-
century reform.2 Finally, I will conclude with a call for more research on
the prosecutor's role in administering juvenile justice. This historical
perspective, I believe, can help us to answer the challenging question of
what children's rights should be.
Before discussing the history of American juvenile justice in the
twentieth century, I want to emphasize that the idea that children are
different from adults predates the American Revolution and was inscribed
by the nation's founders into democratic theory.4 In theory and practice,
children had a right to custody, not liberty. But, as the legal historian
Holly Brewer has noted, the idea that children were incapable of
* Professor and Chair of History, and James E. Rogers Professor of History and Law, University
of Nevada, Las Vegas. I would like to thank Arnold Loewy for his invitation to participate in this
important Symposium; my fellow panelists Richard McAdams, Ron Allen, Tamar Birckhead, and
Patrick Metze; and Robert M. Lawless, Mary Wammack, and Frank Zimring, for their comments on a
draft of this Article that I initially presented at the University of Illinois College of Law.
1. See infra Part II and accompanying text.
2. See infra Part II.
3. See infra Part III.
4. See generally HOLLY BREWER, BY BIRTH OR CONSENT: CHILDREN, LAW, AND THE ANGLO-
AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN AUTHORITY (2005) (analyzing the evolution of children's rights, beginning
in sixteenth-century England, through American colonization, and up to nineteenth-century America).
5. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 8-9, 18-20 (2005); see generally
BREWER, supra note 4, at 4 (explaining that children's lack of the right to choose was explicit in the
custody laws of the time).
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participating in government presented a fundamental problem.6  "If they
have no voice in the laws, how can they be bound by them? ... [T]he
dilemma[,]" she added, "would be directly addressed in 1899 with the
creation of the first juvenile court in Illinois." 7
II. JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE MAKING
Scholars present the history of American juvenile justice in the
twentieth century as a three-part drama, beginning with Jane Addams and
her fellow progressive reformers opening the world's first juvenile court in
Chicago, Illinois, on July 3, 1899.8 The juvenile court movement's leaders
emphasized that this new court should divert children from the criminal
justice system and provide them with needed social services.9 For example,
Timothy Hurley, the first chief probation officer and the author of the first
history of the Cook County Juvenile Court, explained:
Instead of reformation, the thought and idea in the judge's mind should
always be formation. No child should be punished for the purpose of
making an example of him, and he certainly can not be reformed by
punishing him. The parental authority of the State should be exercised
instead of the criminal power.lo
Progressives such as Hurley and Judge Julian Mack published the juvenile
court's first political and legal histories before the paint on the first
children's court buildings had dried." They did so to legitimize the new
institution. 12
6. See BREWER, supra note 4, at 228.
7. Id.
8. Steven Schlossman & David S. Tanenhaus, Juvenile Court, in THE CHILD: AN ENCYCLOPEDIC
COMPANION 525-27 (Richard A. Shweder et al. eds., 2009).
"The history of juvenile court has proceeded in waves. The first wave encompassed its
creation, development, and spread nationally and internationally; the second brought
procedural safeguards and lawyers to juvenile court. The third wave, which crested in the
mid-1990s, included a strong punitive current that washed away many of the court's
distinguishing features (e.g., closed hearings and confidential records) and made it much
easier to prosecute children in the adult criminal justice system."
Id. at 527; see generally DAVID S. TANENHAUS, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE MAKING 23 (2004)
[hereinafter JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE MAKING] (describing the court opening on July 3, 1899).
9. See JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE MAKING, supra note 8, at 22-24.
10. Id. at 23 (quoting T.D. Hurley, Development of the Juvenile Court Idea, in CHILDREN'S
COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES: THEIR ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT, AND RESULTS 8 (photo. reprint 1973)
(1904) (internal quotation marks omitted).
I1. See Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 104-22 (1909). Mack's
article had a longer shelf life than T.D. Hurley's ORIGIN OF THE ILLINOIS JUVENILE COURT LAW:
JUVENILE COURTS AND WHAT THEY HAVE ACCOMPLISHED (1907). Mack's article has been widely
cited. See Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time, 110
MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1497 (2012). Mack's article was once among the top ten most cited articles, but
now is ranked 605. Id.
12. See JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE MAKING, supra note 8, at 82-110.
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And they succeeded. For example, in Commonwealth v. Fisher, the
leading case about the constitutionality of juvenile courts in the first half of
the twentieth century, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court brushed aside the
argument that the juvenile court deprived children of the due process that
they would have received if they had been prosecuted in criminal court.' 3
As the court explained:
The objection that "the act offends against a constitutional provision in
creating, by its terms, different punishments for the same offense by a
classification of individuals," overlooks the fact, hereafter to be noticed,
that it is not for the punishment of offenders but for the salvation of
children, and points out the way by which the state undertakes to save, not
particular children of a special class, but all children under a certain age,
whose salvation may become the duty of the state, in the absence of proper.
parental care or disregard of it by wayward children. No child under the
age of 16 years is excluded from its beneficent provisions. 14
Within a generation, "the American juvenile court ideal-that children's
cases should be diverted from the criminal justice system and handled in a
separate system that emphasized rehabilitation over punishment-had
quickly spread," nationally and internationally. 5
Herbert Lou's Juvenile Courts in the United States, which was published
in 1927 and remained the standard text in the field through the 1950s,
emphasized the benevolence of this approach. Until a "better and finer
agency may be evolved," he concluded, "the juvenile court will remain to
serve as a fountain of mercy, truth, and justice to our handicapped
children."l 6
Significantly, as Jane Addams reported near the end of her life in a
tribute to her friend Julia Lathrop:
There was almost a change in mores when the Juvenile Court was
established. The child was brought before the judge with no one to
prosecute him and with no one to defend him-the judge and all
concerned were merely trying to find out what could be done on his
behalf The element of conflict was absolutely eliminated and with it, all
notion of punishment as such with its curiously belated connotation.17
13. See Commonwealth v. Fisher, 62 A. 198, 200 (Pa. 1905).
14. Id. at 199 (emphasis added).
15. DAVID S. TANENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN: IN RE GAULT AND
JUVENILE JUSTICE 4 (2011) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN].
16. Id. (quoting HERBERT H. LOU, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 220 (1927)).
17. JANE ADDAMS, MY FRIEND, JULIA LATHROP 96 (1935) (emphasis added).
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Judges and probation officers, not prosecutors and defense attorneys, ran
the juvenile court.' 8 Probation officers made the all-important decisions
about when to file delinquent petitions and which children required pre-trial
detention.' 9 Juvenile court judges also determined which accused
adolescent offenders should have their cases transferred to the criminal
justice system for prosecution as adults-a decision the United States
Supreme Court later labeled "critically important" in Kent v. United
States.20
Whereas the first act in this drama falls squarely within the field of
American legal history, Act II is a constitutional story, starring the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Warren Court.2' In 1966,
informed by scathing critiques of juvenile courts in action and mounting
criticism of the legitimating concept of parens patriae (the State as a father
or parent), in 1966 the ACLU sued to free Gerald Gault, a fifteen-year-old
Arizona teenager who had received the equivalent of a six-year prison
sentence for allegedly making an obscene phone call to a neighbor.22 The
ACLU argued that the United States Constitution requires juvenile courts to
follow due process requirements, instead of relying on paternalism as a
cover story for arbitrary decision-making. 23 As the criminologist Norval
Morris stated at the time:
Though we keep on prating parens patriae, we might as well bum incense.
Historical idiosyncrasies gave us a doubtful assumption of power over
children.... Being somewhat facetious about it, the juvenile court is thus
the product of paternal error and maternal generosity, which is a not
unusual genesis of illegitimacy. 2 4
18. See Lou, supra note 16, at 100-01.
19. Id.
20. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553-54 (1966). Justice Fortas wrote:
We do not consider whether, on the merits, Kent should have been transferred; but there is no
place in our system of law for reaching a result of such tremendous consequences without
ceremony-without hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of
reasons. It is inconceivable that a court of justice dealing with adults, with respect to a
similar issue, would proceed in this manner. It would be extraordinary if society's special
concern for children, as reflected in the District of Columbia's Juvenile Court Act, permitted
this procedure. We hold that it does not.
Id. at 553-54.
21. The best introduction to American legal history is THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN
AMERICA (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008). During the 1990s, many graduate
students, including my cohort at the University of Chicago, wrote their doctoral dissertations on the
policing of urban areas during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See RICHARD C.
CORTNER & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS: THREE ARIZONA CASES
(1971); CHRISTOPHER P. MANFREDI, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE (1998);
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra note 15, passim.
22. See CORTNER & LYTLE, supra note 21, at 57-62.
23. See id. at 69.
24. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra note 15, at 104.
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The most dramatic moment in Act II occurred on May 15, 1967, when
Associate Justice Abe Fortas read selections from In re Gault, including his
declaration, "Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not
justify a kangaroo court." 25 The Court's 8-1 decision held that juveniles are
entitled to the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to notice,
counsel, confrontation, and cross-examination of witnesses during
26adjudicatory hearings. In a memo to Fortas, Chief Justice Earl Warren
predicted that Gault would be "known as the Magna Carta for juveniles."27
The "[c]onstitutional [d]omestication" of the American juvenile court
ensured that lawyers would play a more prominent role in the years to
come.28 Although advocates for juvenile reform primarily thought about an
influx of defense counsel into juvenile court, it turns out that the decision
29
ultimately brought more prosecutors than defense attorneys. Perhaps the
most important and overlooked moment in Act II was when Arizona
Assistant Attorney Frank Parks-who had the unenviable task of defending
the theory of parens patriae before the Warren Court during the height of
the due process revolution-observed that if states such as Arizona had to
provide defense counsel for juveniles during adjudicatory hearings, then
these states would presumably also send prosecutors to juvenile court.30
Parks made this observation in passing while being drilled during oral
argument; he did not elaborate on what turned out to be a prescient point.
25. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28 (1967).
26. Id. at 36, 55-56.
27. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra note 15, at 85 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
28. See MANFREDI, supra note 21, at 156-77.
29. See Barry C. Feld, Procedural Rights in Juvenile Courts: Competence and Consequences, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 674 (Barry C. Feld & Donna M.
Bishop eds., 2012).
30. Oral Argument at 102:36, Gault, 387 U.S. 1, available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-
1969/1966/1966 116.
31. Id. Legal academics have long raised concerns about the expansion of prosecutorial power and
discretion in the criminal justice system, which has led to plea-bargaining becoming the norm. See, e.g.,
ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 5 (2007)
(describing the prosecutor's power in the criminal justice system); Miximo Langer, Rethinking Plea
Bargaining: The Practice and Reform of Prosecutorial Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure,
33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 224-25 (2006) (noting that some scholars believe plea bargaining allows
prosecutors to adjudicate in the criminal justice system); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of
Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1521, 1533 (1981) (noting that new prosecutors are encouraged
to seek plea bargains). Concerns about prosecutors acting as adjudicators are now a staple of
scholarship on federal and state criminal justice. See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the
Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REv. 869, 869-70 (2009) for a
good introduction to this literature. Barkow highlights the role that the Burger Court played in
encouraging the use of plea-bargaining in decisions such as Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257
(1971). Barkow, supra, at 879 n.41. In the 1970s, as I will demonstrate in my case study of Florida,
circuit courts issued separation-of-powers decisions that contributed to the legislature constructing a
direct file regime and the expansion of prosecutorial power in cases involving juveniles. See infra note
43 and accompanying text.
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Like many landmark Supreme Court decisions, Gault was only the
beginning. As Norman Dorsen and Daniel Rezneck explained in a 1967
article on the future of family law, "[s]o far-reaching a decision [as In re
Gault] will initiate a lengthy process of constitutional adjudication,
accompanied by legislative change and alteration of administrative and
judicial practices." 32 "They emphasized that change would most likely take
place at the state level and added that the 'Supreme Court can be expected
to participate only sporadically in this process of change, through the
review of cases carefully selected to focus on critical problems of the
juvenile system."' 3 3 They were right about the Supreme Court and juvenile
justice. The Court did hear four juvenile justice procedural cases in the
1970s and 1980s, but only since 2005 have the Justices revisited some of
the key questions raised by the Gault litigation nearly a half century ago.34
The key point about Act II, which Dorsen and Rezneck highlighted in
1967, is that legislatures would command center stage. Journalists and
scholars have explored only part of the legislative history of the 1970s and
1980s. The best work includes studies of New York lowering the eligible
age for criminal responsibility to thirteen years old for murder and fourteen
years old for other violent crimes in 1978.6 New York made the only
major change to a juvenile justice system in the 1970s, although other states
began to rewrite the purpose clauses of their juvenile justice legislation to
emphasize public safety.37 The moral of the New York story, as some have
argued, is that juvenile justice systems require a transfer mechanism to
serve as a safety valve.38 Otherwise, there will be a punishment gap
between what the juvenile court can deliver and what the public may
demand.39
32. Norman Dorsen & Daniel A. Rezneck, In re Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law, 1 FAM.
L.Q., no. 4, 1967 at 1.
33. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra note 15, at 98.
34. The first wave of procedural due process cases began in the 1970s. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S.
253, 281 (1984) (establishing preventive detention in juvenile cases); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541
(1975) (establishing the double-jeopardy standard in juvenile cases); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403
U.S. 528, 543 (1971) (holding that "accurate factfinding" did not require jury trials in juvenile cases); In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (establishing the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in juvenile
cases). More recently, the Court abolished the juvenile death penalty in Roper v. Simmons, eliminated
life without the possibility of parole sentences for crimes excluding murder in Graham v. Florida,
revised Miranda warnings for juveniles in JB.D. v. North Carolina, and eliminated mandatory life
without the possibility of parole sentences for juvenile offenders in Miller v. Alabama. Miller v.
Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2399 (2011);
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).
35. Dorsen & Rezneck, supra note 32, at 6 n.25.
36. See Fox BUTTERFIELD, ALL GOD'S CHILDREN: THE BOSKET FAMILY AND THE AMERICAN
TRADITION OF VIOLENCE (1995); SIMON I. SINGER, RECRIMINALIZING DELINQUENCY: VIOLENT
JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM (1996).
37. See MANFREDI, supra note 21, at 169-77.
38. See ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 149.
39. See id. at 143.
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The truly significant historical fact about the period from the aftermath
of Gault to the moral panic of the 1990s is that, by diverting adolescents
from the criminal justice system, juvenile justice systems spared them from
the destructive punishments of the criminal justice system in the age of
mass incarceration.40 In 1971, the incarceration rates for adolescents
(fourteen- to seventeen-year-olds) and young adults (eighteen- to twenty-
four-year-olds) were similar, but these rates diverged dramatically by the
1990s. 4 1 In 1991, for example, the incarceration rate for young adults was
approximately twice the rate for adolescents.4 2
My new book project, The Prosecution Never Rests, examines the
major legislative story from the early 1980s: the creation and
implementation of a direct file regime in Florida. This new regime made it
possible for Florida's prosecutors to transfer more adolescents to criminal
court than juvenile court judges did in the entire country during the 1990s. 43
Although I have not completed my empirical research, my initial findings
suggest that Florida's incarceration rate for adolescents was similar to the
national average for young adults, whereas the incarceration rate for
adolescents in Georgia, which maintained a traditional juvenile justice
system, was similar to the national average for adolescents.
Florida, which changed its laws before the moral panic over juvenile
crime in the late 1980s and early 1990s, serves as the rehearsal for the third
act of American juvenile justice reform in the twentieth century-popularly
known as the "get-tough" era." Like the progressives who wrote the first
histories of the juvenile court to legitimize the new institution, crime
control advocates in the 1990s also used "history."4A They argued that
juvenile courts were never intended to hear the cases of today's youth (i.e.,
super-predators) because the circumstances present during this era were
truly unprecedented.4 6  Several scholars even went one step further and
40. See Franklin E. Zimring, The Common Thread: Diversion in the Jurisprudence of Juvenile
Courts, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 142, 152-55 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002).
Heather Ann Thompson has called for historians to study mass incarceration as a major transformative
force in modem American history. See Heather Ann Thompson, Why Mass Incarceration Matters:
Rethinking Crisis, Decline, and Transformation in Postwar American History, 97 J. AM. HIST. 703, 734
(2010).
41. ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 46.
42. Id.
43. See Barry C. Feld & Donna M. Bishop, Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 801, 821 (Barry C. Feld & Donna M.
Bishop eds., 2012).
44. See idat 825-26.
45. See David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, "Owing to the Extreme Youth of the Accused":
The Changing Legal Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 641, 642 (2002).
46. See id.
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predicted that a tidal wave of juvenile crime would soon flood the nation.4 7
They were, as it turned out, wrong.4 8
Yet public concerns about serious and violent juvenile offending
paved the way for almost every state to make it easier to prosecute
adolescents as adults.4 9 The story of the 1990s, however, differs from what
happened in New York in the 1970s and Florida in the 1980s. Instead of
legislating ways to prosecute mass numbers of adolescents as adults (e.g.,
lowering the upper jurisdictional age of the juvenile court or developing a
direct file regime), states enacted legislation that transferred decision-
making within the juvenile court from judges and probation officers to
prosecutors. By examining the debates in the mid to late 1990s over
"blended sentencing" or what the late Texas law professor Robert Dawson
called the "[t]hird []ustice [s]ystem," I argue that we can better understand
the political struggles over ownership of the juvenile court during Act III.50
State legislatures considered and adopted a variety of approaches to
blended sentencing in the mid to late 1990s.51 Although the approaches
differed, supporters of blended sentencing argued that making juvenile
courts more like criminal courts was absolutely necessary to save the
juvenile court.5 2 The child welfare proponents of blended sentencing, for
example, contended that they were trying to keep as many adolescents as
possible from being transferred out of the juvenile court, while
simultaneously providing them with more due process protections and one
last chance to reform before they turned eighteen or twenty-one.5 3 They
argued that this third system could shield the juvenile court from its
critics.54 But what if, as our keynote speaker Frank Zimring argued, the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court was not actually under attack? What if
47. See Fox Butterfield, Experts on Crime Warn ofa 'Ticking Time Bomb', N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6,
1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/06/us/experts-on-crime-warn-of-a-ticking-time-bomb.html.
48. See Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 45, at 642.
49. See Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimnring, Editors' Introduction, in THE CHANGING BORDERS
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 1, 1 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000).
50. See generally Robert 0. Dawson, The Third Justice System: The New Juvenile-Criminal
System of Determinate Sentencing for the Youthful Violent Offender in Texas, 19 ST. MARY'S L.J. 943
(1988) (discussing issues and changes in juvenile sentencing). Professor Dawson drafted the 1987 Texas
legislation that allowed for his state to address the cases of serious and violent offenses by children
under the state's minimum transfer age of fifteen. Id. at 943-46. He did so to prevent Texas from
following in the footsteps of Florida. See Robert O. Dawson, Judicial Waiver in Theory and Practice, in
THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 49, at 45, 77. Yet, as Dawson later noted,
"As originally enacted, these provisions permitted a sentence of up to thirty years (later increased to
forty) for a superserious short list of offenses (capital murder, murder, attempted capital murder,
aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated sexual assault) committed by a juvenile ten or older... . The
system was changed in 1995 to increase greatly the number of offenses covered from five to almost
thirty." Id. at 77.
51. See Richard E. Redding & James C. Howell, Blended Sentencing in American Juvenile Courts,
in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 49, at 145, 145-46.
52. See id. at 146-80.
53. Seeid. at 147-51.
54. Id.
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control over the court itself was the real agenda? He argues "that
misreading the real agenda of the 1990s created a catastrophic error in
response from many in juvenile justice. ... Those who hoped to hold on to
a few cases otherwise headed for criminal court by sacrificing judicial
power and limited punishment system-wide," he concludes, "would
celebrate a victory only General Pyrrhus could fully appreciate."s He may
be right.
But Act III did end.16 When and why did the get-tough era become
part of history? Some argue that the massacre at Columbine High School
was a turning point in thinking about youth policy.57 Others point to the
dramatic and sustained decline in the nation's crime rate since the early
1990s, successful youth advocacy, and the Supreme Court's decision in
Roper v. Simmons, which abolished the juvenile death penalty.ss I am
currently searching for answers to this question in state legislative histories.
III. CONCLUSION
Once my research is complete, I plan to address the role of the
prosecutor in the future of juvenile justice. The literature on policing
prosecutors in the criminal justice system, as Rachel Barkow has pointed
out, "while strong in theory," has fallen "short in reality."59 She highlights
how promising ideas such as increasing judicial oversight, limiting plea-
bargaining or charging discretion, expanding legislative or public oversight,
or crafting prosecutorial guidelines and open processes, have either been
non-starters or have produced unintended consequences.o Proponents of
juvenile justice reform, thus, should be cautious about recommending
similar solutions to address prosecutorial power in the context of juvenile
justice. Unfortunately, Barkow's recommendation for internally restruc-
turing federal prosecutors' offices to separate investigative work from
adjudicative decision-making (e.g., charging and offering plea deals) may
not be well-suited for juvenile justice because the majority of juvenile
prosecutors' offices are too lightly staffed.
The promise of reform, I believe, must begin first with an emphatic
rejection of the National District Attorneys Association's proposals for a
dramatic expansion of the role of the prosecutor in the administration of
55. Franklin E. Zimring, The Power Politics of Juvenile Court Transfer: A Mildly Revisionist
History of the 1990s, 71 LA. L. REV. 1, 14 (2010).
56. Jeffrey A. Butts & Daniel P. Mears, Reviving Juvenile Justice in a Get-Tough Era, 33 YOUTH
& SOCIETY, Dec. 2001, at 169, 169-71.
57. See Daniel M. Filler, Random Violence and the Transformation of the Juvenile Justice Debate,
86 VA. L. REv. 1095, 1095-96 (2000) (reviewing JOEL BEST, RANDOM VIOLENCE: How WE TALK
ABouT NEW CRIMES AND NEW vICTIMS (1999)).
58. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005); Feld& Bishop, supra note 43, at907-10.
59. Barkow, supra note 31, at 907.
60. Id. at 871-74.
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juvenile justice. Instead, prosecutors need to learn to identify with the
distinctive features of juvenile justice. These include investing in and
facilitating the development of youth and avoiding destructive levels of
punishment.62 The literature on courtroom workgroups, including studies
of how criminal court judges sentence adolescents, suggests that identifying
with the juvenile court ideal can and does happen in unexpected places.63
Studying the history and jurisprudence of juvenile justice, as I have argued
elsewhere, is a good place to start.
61. See James C. Backstrom & Gary L. Walker, The Role of the Prosecutor in Juvenile Justice:
Advocacy in the Courtroom and Leadership in the Community, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 963, 986
(2006).
62. See AARON KUPCHIK, JUDGING JUVENILES: PROSECUTING ADOLESCENTS IN ADULT AND
JUVENILE COURTS 109-30 (2006).
63. Id.
64. See JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE MAKING, supra note 8, at 159-66.
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